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one test, whether clinical or laboratory, suffices" (p. 94). And that medical 
judgment is best made usually by the patient's attending physician. 
The book's second half (ch. 7 and on) concerns ethics itself, its foundations 
and presuppositions. O'Reilly argues well that bioethics is not a normative science. 
So where derive its norms? He does not hold for a valid rational ethics apart from 
the integral vision of man provided by God's Revelation. He critiques (ch. 8) false 
humanism and faulty ethical systems quite thoroughly. And in outlining true 
humanism and Christian ethics (ch. 9) he provides an especially clear explanation 
of the classic "sources of morality" (object-circumstances-end, pp. 129-134) in a 
chapter that amounts to a blitz review of fundamental moral theology. 
The final chapter (10) reviews the authority of the Church in ethics and ethical 
decisions, particularly authoritative moral teaching post-Vatican II and post-
Humanae Vitae. In fact, the argument h ere is more ecclesiological than ethical, 
but that only fits the post-Vatican II, post-Humanae Vitae facts which contro-
versies have been more about the nature of the Church and h er teaching than 
abou t the pros and cons of specific moral questions. 
In summation, O'Reilly succeeds in his first stated purpose - to present the 
nature of modern science, its method, achievements and limitations. He does this 
in clearly written, logically coherent and very informative accounts of modern 
physics and biology . 
On ethical theory and its presuppositions, he stresses an objective moral order, 
ultimately dependent on God, that man can come to know. Given human fallibil-
ity, God has given Revelation and the Church as the certain guide for living 
rightly. In moving from that objective moral order (open to reason) to the need 
for authoritative Revelation , some Catholic ethicists and moralists might think 
O'Reilly moves too quickly. 
Followers of von Hildebrand will easily follow with O'Reilly, but other 
Thomists (especially recent ones) will like to see a larger role for "right reason" 
grounded in St. Thomas's natural law theory. 
The book is instructive and it does inform the reader both in scientific informa-
tion and ethical theory. As at the start, the big questions of "life and death " are 
treated superbly, as are the nature of modern science, its method and limitations. 
Several current "hot items" in bioethics are not treated directly, but such specifics 
can only be considered intelligently when the big basic presuppositions have been 
defined, delineated and digested. This volume does that first work well. 
- Rev. William B. Smith, S.T.D. 
Professor of Moral Theology 
St. Joseph's Seminary 
Dunwoodie 
Infanticide and the Value of Life 
Marvin Kohl, Editor 
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, N. Y, 1978. 
As an example of the kinds of arguments offered by those who favor infanti-
cide for some defect ive newborns, this book is a very useful compendium. It also 
ought to be very useful to those who deplore infanticide , for in general, the essays 
are notable only [or their lapses in argument, their evasion o[ central issues and 
their vague and inapp licable cr iteria for deciding which infants shall die . The 17 
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essays are mostly new and represent a spectrum of specialties including religion, 
medicine, philosophy and the social sciences. While the topics covered center on 
the moral questions involved, there are papers on the legal issues, on the psycho-
logical and an thropological dimensions of the problem, and statements of the 
Jewish and Christian theological positions involved (Immanual Jakobovitz on the 
J ewish position and John Donnelly on the Christian view of suffering). There is 
also a brief annotated bibliography and an appendix in which law professor Arval 
Morris offers a proposed infanticide law. 
The general position taken by most of the authors may be gauged from a sec-
tion of Morris's proposed law. In describing which children are "qualified" (a 
revealing term) for euthanasia under the proposed law, he writes: 
Irremedial condition means either (a) a serious physical illness, including 
serious genetic defects, serious birth defects, or other physical impairment 
which is diagnosed as severe and incurable and which is expected to cause a 
child severe distress or pain and to render him incapable of the rational or 
functional existence needed to enjoy the most minimal amount of human 
goods necessary to constitute human life in its most minimal sense, or (b) a 
condition of brain or genetic damage or deterioration such that what would 
be a child's normal mental or genetic faculties are so severely or irreparably 
impaired to such an extent that the child has been rendered incapable of 
leading a rational existence. 
This simply will not do. The crucial phrases about "rational or functional exis-
tence" are never defined , either here or in Morris's longer paper. What they might 
mean in practice is left to arbitrary guesswork or probably sheer prejudice against 
the retarded. Unfortunately this is representative of far too many of the essays in 
the book. We are constantly told of individuals who are "incapable of a rational 
existence," of those with a "meaningless existence," of "vegetables," or of lives 
that are "bad on the whole. " The vagueness of such concepts is obvious. Their 
uselessness as guides to practice is even more apparent. Yet, they continue to 
appear throughout the essays with a relentlessness as astonishing as it is deplor-
able. Finally Anthony Shaw comes clean on the issue: there is no such standard 
on which we can find agreement, yet we still must go on doing what is done 
today - infanticide in selected cases - for reasons that are never given. This is 
about as persuasive as a proposal to continue with racial prejudice. 
These are intelligent authors, mainly philosophers, whose discipline has gen-
erally prided itself as being a bastion of conceptual rigor and analytic precision. 
But the conceptual apparatus above is hopelessly vague and weak. Consider, for 
example, Marvin Kohl's argument in which he claims that: "A span of life 
becomes devoid of meaning roughly when, or to the extent to which, an individual 
cannot possess goals or when, if he can and does have goals, he believes they are 
trivial or impossible to achieve." As a matter of policy this definition of the 
"meaningless life" is unacceptable. If he means to claim that any goal, no matter 
how small, is adequate to give life meaning, then there will be virtually no infants 
in the "meaningless life" category. Even the most severely defective children can 
pursue certain aims, especially under the guidance of wise therapists and/or 
parents. 
If on the other hand he means either a) that one must consciously possess goals 
one knows one has, or b) that the goals must not be as minimal as implied above, 
then he has offered us a very disturbing and morally offensive description of the 
lives of hundreds of thousands of profoundly and severely retarded persons. 
Kohl's point, however, is obvious : ending meaningless lives is a morally right act. 
But on the further question, "Are we obligated to do this?" he hedges, undoubt-
edly aware that he is on the edge of a genocide program. The hedge is in-effective. 
He claims that while one may abhor something, e.g., ugliness, one is not thereby 
free to destroy all ugly things. Why not? Presumably either because they have 
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some other valuable qualities or because someone else subjectively values them. 
The latter alternative would rule out all infanticide and Kohl cannot be supposed 
to have intended this result. We are left, therefore , with the former alternative. 
Unfortunately, this is not muc h help either. In order to rule out genocide we 
would need to know what these overriding qualiti es are and why so me infants 
have them and others don't. These are questions that Kohl steadfastly refuses to 
answer. In fact, I think that it wo uld be very difficult for him to do so . He has 
already maintained that these "individuals" have completely "meaningless" lives 
and that ending such lives is a morally right act (at least prima facie) . If a person 
really does have such a life, would it not be a paradigm of cruelty to inflict con-
tinued existence on him? I fail to see any reason not to conclude that except in a 
very few cases (which rem ain unspecified anyway), all of these lives ought to be 
ended. The fact is that Kohl has given a case for the mass elimination of tens of 
thousands of infants and children and he has not succeeded in separating himself 
from the logic of his argument. 
Richard Brandt 's essay is not better than Kohl's. He contents himself with 
asserting that we might establish a happiness curve for individuals centered around 
an "i ndifference axis." The curve would go above the axis for a moment of happi-
ness and below it for a moment of unhappiness. On this basis he believes we could 
decide when some lives are " bad on the whole." For such infants killing them is 
morally acceptable. Typically , he never gives us any clear idea of how we could 
decide where to place any given moment on the curve. Even without such criteria, 
the proposal is contradictory on its face. 
Brandt argues that the neonate does not have any wants, desires or ex peri ences 
that are the basis for the concept of consent. He cannot care about life since he 
knows nothing of it. Grant this and the judgment of hi s "happiness curve" 
becom es the worst exampl e of arbitrary paternalism. We decide not that he will 
think his life bad (we h ave no way of knowing what he will think) but rather, that 
we believe his life will be bad. Why? Simply because we would not want it our-
se lves? I cannot see any other alternative on Bl·andt's own grounds. For example , 
he writes: "There are also som e positive enjoy m ents: of eating, drinking, elimina-
tion , seeing the nurse coming with food and so on. But the brief enjoy m ents can 
hardly balance t he long stretches of boredom, discomfort or even pain. On th e 
whole, the lives of such children are bad according to the happiness criterion ." 
Severely abnormal children are hard ly ever in pain for long periods so as a descrip-
tion of those he wishes to kill, this will not do. DiscomfOl·t and boredom are no 
better. Brandt sure ly finds boredom unpl easant and believes that the li fe of the 
defective child will be boring for long periods. Boring for Brandt - yes . Boring for 
the child - probably not. At th e very least, o n Brandt's own gro unds we have no 
way to say whether the infant's life will be boring and to assert t hat it only 
be trays a prejudice against seve rely defective infants and children. In th e end 
Brandt gives us li ttle more than a vic io us circle in which to find the missing 
answers in hi s paper. The lives in question are bad because he believes th ey a re 
bad, a simple and totally unconvincing c lai m. 
These essays are unfortunately representative of the positions taken by many 
of t hose in the book. They all speak in large and abstract terms with no attention 
to precise criteria or to the logical app lication of what they do say to cl in ical prac-
tice. But the logi c of what we are told is clear: there wou ld be nothing wrong with 
the mass e liminat ion of sevel·al hundred thousand profoundly or severe ly reta rded 
persons. 
This criticism is not true of some of the papers. A few remain at the level of 
purely theoretical questions, som e are largely descriptive, and sti ll others dispute 
the permissibility of infantic ide. In the first category Steph en Nathanson offers an 
intriguing paper, "Nihilism, Reason and the Value of Life, " which is more an 
essay on nihili sm than anything else. It is interesting bu t somewhat unrelated to 
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the more practical concerns of the book. In the second category are papers on the 
psychology of infanticide and an anthropological survey of the question in other 
cultures. In the third category, five papers may be said to dispute the ethics on 
infanticide but only one of these really goes to the heart of the matter in a phil-
osophically acceptable manner. The essays of Jakobovitz and Donnelly really dis-
cuss the views of the Jewish and Christian traditions respectively and so will be 
unacceptable to those who do not share their religious premises. Leonard Weber 
makes a case for keeping the law the way it is on these matters , but the theoretical 
side of his essay is rather weak and undeveloped. Karen Meltzer's essay is impor-
tant symbolically but is not in itself the rigorous work needed to defend her posi-
tion. She is a young woman who was born with spina bifida and other problems. 
Having undergone numerous operations, she has since graduated magna cum laude 
from college and now works as a health care consultant. 
Kluge's paper is the only critical piece that really develops a philosophically 
adequate position. Straightforwardly, he contends that infanticide is murder and 
ought to be treated as such, independently of the supposed quality of li fe of the 
infant. This conclusion, however, is marred by his seeming willingness to counten-
ance some instances of infanticide, without again giving us any clear idea of which 
cases these might be. 
Yet this question, which most authors simply don't handle and others handle 
badly , is crucial from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint. Its practical 
importance is obvious, but except for writers like Joseph Fletcher who disdain 
moral rules, its theoretical importance ought to be obvious as well. As Brand t him-
self has previously argued, we must evaluate moral rules in terms of their consis-
tency and their capability to generate acceptable conclusions if they are general-
ized to all similar cases. Hence, the only proper way to evaluate proposals for 
infanticide would be to see where they would lead to if generalized. Few of the 
authors in this book, however, even try to answer this query. Those who do , 
present us with proposals that would, if generalized, lead to the mass elimination 
of severely retarded persons. If this is not an unacceptable conclusion to a moral 
policy proposal, then I simply do not know what such an unacceptable proposal 
would be. 
- Richard Sherlock 
University of Tennessee 
Center for the Health Sciences 
Whatever Happened to the Human Race? 
Francis A. Schaeffer and C. Everett Koop, M.D. 
Fleming H. Revell Co., Old Tappan, N. J. , 1979,256 pp. 
Whatever Happened to the Human Race 2 is not a profound book , but it is 
interesting on several counts. Francis Schaeffel· is an evangelical Protestant author 
who has formed a Christian community in L ' Abri, Switzerland and gathered an 
appreciable worldwide following. He is not a particularly deep or innovative 
thinker, but he is capable of popularizing the thought of others. Schaeffer has 
teamed up with a pediatric surgeon, C. Everett Koop, to produce a popular po lemic 
against the growing practices of abortion, infanticide and euthanasia. 
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